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The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the
trade-oﬀ between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests
that detection probability and ﬁnes are substitutes. In this paper it
is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by
costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become com-
plements. When oﬀenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary
sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detec-
tion. If oﬀenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary
sanctions is high, so it is more proﬁtable to prosecute them.
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11 Introduction
The proposition that crime rates respond to risks and beneﬁts is called the
deterrence hypothesis. It is an application of the theory of demand to one
of the most important issues in criminal justice. The hypothesis asserts that
people respond signiﬁcantly to the incentives created by the criminal justice
system. If so, increasing the resources that society devotes to the arrest,
conviction, and punishment of criminals will reduce the amount and social
cost of crime.
Suppose that there is a particular oﬀense that we wish to deter, say,
illegal parking. It might be possible to eliminate illegal parking, or very
nearly eliminate it, by imposing a severe punishment with high probability.
However, deterring illegal parking in this way may run into a cost prob-
lem. Apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing oﬀenders can be expensive.
Policy-makers should balance these costs against the advantages of reducing
illegal parking.1
In this paper, we reconsider the high ﬁne-low probability result by Becker
(1968): When deciding whether or not to commit an act, an individual com-
pares the beneﬁt from the act with the expected punishment. The expected
punishment is given by the probability of detection and punishment times a
monetary sanction. A ﬁne is a costless transfer from the convicted oﬀender
to the government. In contrast, detection is expensive. Consequently, the
government should set the ﬁne equal to an oﬀender’s entire wealth and com-
plement it with the appropriate probability in order to achieve optimal deter-
rence. This high ﬁne-low probability result suggests the following corollary:
If the agents’ wealth goes up, the government should increase the sanction
and, at the same time, reduce the probability of detection. That way the
government still provides for optimal deterrence, but saves resources on law
enforcement.
1See Garoupa (1997), and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
2We show that this corollary (the substitutability between ﬁne and prob-
ability) only holds if the social optimum involves nearly full deterrence. If
there is substantial underdeterrence (the expected ﬁne is signiﬁcantly less
than the social damage caused by the oﬀense), then there is a complemen-
tary relationship between the two variables. When the ﬁne goes up, so should
the probability of detection.
In order to understand this result, consider a rather extreme case where
the agent’s wealth is zero. In this case, ﬁnes are zero and the deterrent
value is zero. Thus, it makes absolutely no sense to spend money on enforce-
ment. When wealth goes up, so do ﬁnes. Now it becomes worthwhile for the
government to engage in detection and punishment. As a consequence, we
have a complementary relationship between ﬁne and probability when there
is substantial underdeterrence (alternatively, when oﬀenders are poor). This
contrasts with the conventional substitutability which holds if the expected
sanction is close to the social damage caused by the oﬀense.
The paper is organized as follows: the result is formally derived in section
two; ﬁnal remarks are addressed in section three. All proofs are relegated to
the appendix.
2 The model
Risk-neutral individuals choose whether or not to commit an act that beneﬁts
the actor by b and harms the rest of society by h. The policy-maker does
not know any individual’s b but knows the distribution of parties by type
described by a general density function g(b) with support [0;1), a cumulative
distribution G(b), and a distribution elasticity (b) = g0(b)b=g(b). Some
acts are socially beneﬁcial: h < 1.
The government chooses a sanction, f, and a probability of detection
and conviction, p. The expenditure on detection and conviction to achieve
a probability p is given by x(p), where xp > 0 and xpp  0. The maximum
3feasible sanction is F, which can be interpreted as the maximum wealth of
individuals. We further assume that the sanction is costless to impose and
collect. The objective function to be maximized is the sum of individuals’
beneﬁts minus the harm caused by their acts and enforcement costs.2
Risk-neutral individuals commit an oﬀense if and only if b  pf. Given




(b  h)dG(b)  x(p) (1)
The government maximizes the welfare function with respect to f (severity
of punishment) and p (probability of punishment) subject to f  F.3 The
public sector budget is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation.
Proposition 1 (1) The optimal ﬁne is the maximal ﬁne. (2) The optimal
probability of detection and conviction satisﬁes F(h  pF)g(pF) = xp(p).
(3) Some underdeterrence is optimal.
We have formally derived Becker’s argument. We can now establish that
the optimal probability is not necessarily monotonically decreasing in the
maximal ﬁne.
Proposition 2 (1) If (pF) < 1, the optimal probability increases with
the maximal ﬁne if the expected sanction is less than h(1  )=(2  ). (2)
If (pF)  1, the optimal probability is monotonically decreasing in the
maximal ﬁne.
2We use the conventional social welfare functional. The inclusion of illegal gains is con-
troversial and has been questioned by several scholars. See Lewin and Trembull (1990) and
Polinsky and Shavell (2000). Shavell (1985) acknowledges that there may be a divergence
between social value and private gain. The divergence could be expressed by inserting a
coeﬃcient of social value in this model.
3We study non-trivial solutions. Therefore, we ignore the following constraints: f  0
and 0  p  1. We assume that these constraints are not binding.
4Comparative statics show that the optimal probability of detection is not
monotonically decreasing in the maximal ﬁne as implicitly assumed in the
literature.
If the maximal ﬁne is high, the level of deterrence is also high and the
diﬀerence between full internalization and optimal deterrence is small. If F
increases, the probability p can be reduced, achieving the same deterrence
level at lower enforcement costs. This is Becker’s trade-oﬀ.
However, if the maximum ﬁne is very small, the level of deterrence is very
low. In this case, an increase in F increases the deterrence value of any given
p substantially and thus makes it more proﬁtable to increase p. Thus, in this
range the probability and magnitude of ﬁnes are complements rather than
substitutes.
At lower levels of deterrence the gain in deterrence dominates enforcement
costs. At higher levels of deterrence the increase in costs dominates the gain
in deterrence. Continuity suggests that there is a turning-point in between,
which is conﬁrmed by Proposition 2.
A simple example helps to understand the result: When people are poor,
the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Given this observation, we
do not want to invest a lot in catching people (if sanctions were limited to one
penny, the deterrent value of sanctions would be essentially zero, so we would
hardly spend anything on catching people). If people are rich, however, then
the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is worth investing
in catching them. Hence, the wealthier, but not the wealthiest, should face
a higher probability of detection for the same oﬀense, since the wealthiest
individuals will face a suﬃciently high sanction.
This result prevails as long as the elasticity of deterrence with respect
to the expected ﬁnes is relatively low. Otherwise, the increase in deterrence
from increasing the expected sanction is large enough to make sure that
Becker’s trade-oﬀ holds.
5Proposition 3 When the maximal ﬁne F increases, the expected sanction
also increases.
When probability and severity of punishment are substitutes, an increase
of the maximal ﬁne always dominates the consequent reduction of the prob-
ability of punishment in such a way that the expected sanction increases.
Take the limit case where the expected sanction equals the harm h. Then an
increase of the maximal ﬁne is exactly oﬀset by the reduction of the proba-
bility of punishment. However, we know that the expected ﬁne is less than h
because enforcement is costly. Therefore, when the maximal ﬁne increases,
we can reduce the probability (saving on enforcement costs), but not to the
point of exactly oﬀsetting the increase of the maximal ﬁne (making further
gains in deterrence). From Proposition 1, we know that the level of un-
derdeterrence is decreasing in the maximal ﬁne. To see this, we can write
(h  pF)g(pF) = xp(p)=F. The level of underdeterrence increases when
the marginal cost of enforcement relative to the value of the assets forfeited
increases. An increase of the maximal ﬁne implies that this relative value
decreases, so the level of underdeterrence also decreases.
3 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have argued that the trade-oﬀ between probability and
severity of punishment may not be consistent with optimal law enforcement
when there is substantial underdeterrence. When the optimal expected sanc-
tion is suﬃciently large, we approach complete deterrence (the negative ex-
ternality is fully internalized). By increasing the maximal ﬁne, we can relax
the probability achieving the same deterrence level and saving on enforce-
ment costs. However, when the optimal expected sanction is low, we have
substantial underdeterrence. By increasing the maximal ﬁne, we should also
increase the probability making further gains in deterrence.
6The maximal ﬁne has been interpreted as the entire wealth of an individ-
ual throughout this paper; all individuals having the same wealth. Polinsky
and Shavell (1991) have considered the case where wealth varies among in-
dividuals. An individual’s wealth is observed once detected and convicted
but not beforehand. Therefore, the severity of punishment is conditional
on wealth but not the probability of punishment. In our model, both the
severity and probability of punishment have been conditional on wealth. In
other words, in our model, a potential oﬀender’s wealth is observable before
detection and conviction.
Polinsky and Shavell essentially say that any individual, when detected,
should pay a monetary sanction given by the harm divided by the probability.4
However, if the oﬀender cannot aﬀord it, he pays his entire wealth (the maxi-
mal ﬁne in Becker’s sense). Those that are able to pay the ﬁne are completely
deterred since their expected sanction equals the social damage they cause.
Those that are not able to pay the ﬁne, and lose their entire wealth, are
underdeterred since their expected sanction is less than the harm they cause.
We have shown in our model that such policy is not optimal when wealth
is observable before detection. Within our model both groups are underde-
terred because every potential oﬀender faces an expected sanction less than
the harm they cause.
When wealth is not observable before detection, the probability is the
same for all oﬀenders. When wealth is observable before detection, our result
shows that the probability of detection and conviction is concave in wealth:
The optimal probability is low when the sanction is too low (because it
is not proﬁtable to prosecute these individuals) and when the sanction is
suﬃciently large (the usual Becker’s trade-oﬀ). In the formulation given by
Polinsky and Shavell, very poor individuals and very wealthy individuals face
a probability which is too high. For wealthy individuals, the fact that the
4A result known in the literature as the ‘multiplier principle’.
7government cannot observe wealth beforehand means that they bear a lower
sanction and a higher probability than when wealth is observable beforehand
(Becker’s usual argument). As for very poor individuals, they also face a
higher probability because it is not worthwhile for the government to invest
in catching these oﬀenders (the sanction is already at its highest feasible
value).
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Deﬁne the Lagrangean function as L = W + (F  f). The optimal f and
p must satisfy :
Lf = p(h  pf)g(pf)   = 0 (2)
Lp = f(h  pf)g(pf)  xp = 0 (3)
where L is the Lagrangean, and  is the Lagrangean multiplier. Suppose the
optimal ﬁne is not maximal. From (2), we have pf = h. However, from
(3), we know that this is impossible because Lp < 0. Hence, the optimal
solution must be f = F and  > 0.















The second-order condition is satisﬁed as long as x(:) exhibits suﬃciently
decreasing returns to scale.2
9Proof of Proposition 2
By the implicit function theorem, we have that the sign of @p=@F is given
by the sign of WpF:
WpF = (h  2p
F)g(p







F)  (h  p
F)(p
F)]
The result is clear.2
Proof of Proposition 3
Deﬁne z = pF. We must show that zF = p  FWpF=Wpp > 0, or equiva-
lently, FWpF > pWpp:
FWpF = g(p
F)[(h  2p











We can also observe that:
FWpF  p
Wpp = (h  p
F)Fg(p
F) + p
xpp > 0
The result follows.2
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